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I. INTRODUCTION
Disclaimers are a common feature of public and commercial life.1
While this article will be concerned with disclaimers only in legal contexts,
* Lawrence A. Jegen III Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; J.D.,
Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis (1982); Ph.D., Indiana University (1976); A.B.,
University of Virginia (1972). The author is grateful for assistance and counsel to Rachel Anne Scher-
er.
1. The author's disclaimer commonly may take one of two related forms. In the first form, the
disclaimer protects an institution with which the author is affiliated from unapproved association with
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the range of such legal contexts is broad. This article will refer below to
disclaimers2 by governmental and non-governmental actors in various cir-
cumstances. Disclaimers arise, for example, in Establishment Clause cases
in general,3 and of late, in cases involving public school evolution text-
the author's controversial views or conclusions. Sometimes, this first form of disclaimer is accompa-
nied by a disclosure, as that the author had involvement in litigating one or more of the cases discussed.
By contrast, the second form of author disclaimer seeks to protect colleagues and others, gratefully
thanked by the author for their valuable assistance, from being tarred by association with the work.
Since vigorous criticism as to fundamental matters is often the most valuable sort of such collegial
assistance, we should all work to strengthen the presumption that being generally thanked by the author
does not imply any measure of agreement with the author.
In the extreme case, however, a disclaimer seeking to absolve all of one's mentors and teachers
of any and all causal and moral responsibility for any of one's views might be implausible. The custo-
mary disclaimer seeks to limit responsibility for all controversial opinions and errors to the immediate
author. One could, however, just as well argue that one or more influential other persons may bear
shared responsibility. But again, a scholarly convention of confining responsibility to the authors
probably encourages more willing assistance by others.
For an unusual externalization of responsibility, see Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales:
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1645 n.aaal (2004), where the authors stated that
"[a]ll remaining errors are the sole responsibility of McDonald's." For a more limited disclaimer,
grounded in social theory, see Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommu-
nications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REv. 1, 1 n.al (2000), where the author stated, "As I have doubts
about the concept of independent authorship, responsibility for any remaining errors is no more mine
than responsibility for any insights." For an attempted, if jocular, displacement of responsibility onto
pre-publication reviewers, see Jeffrey Evans Stake, Who's "Number One": Contriving Unidimensio-
nality in Law School Grading, 68 IND. L.J. 925, 925 n.al (1993), where the author thanked specific
commenters "who, careful readers as they are, would have to be held responsible for any remaining
errors."
The typical scholarly'disclaimer, in which the author seeks to bear all possible responsibility,
may be questionable as social theory-and even as moral theory-but may have the virtue of encourag-
ing advance critique of academic work. The problem is that, as many academic disclaimers expressly
recognize, there is already a well-established broad convention against holding pre-publication readers
responsible for an author's controversial opinions, with or without any disclaimer. See, e.g., Steven P.
Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91
MICH. L. REv. 683, 683 n.aa (1993) (including, as with many such disclaimers, the phrase "of course"
while, in this instance, also seeking to "hereby disclaim liability for the costs of any injuries-
pecuniary or nonpecuniary-that this article may cause").
This general pattern will be replicated below in several important legal contexts and throughout
the law of disclaimers.
2. In the sense in which we are interested, a disclaimer is roughly a form of disavowal, denial, or
repudiation. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 645 (1961) (defining "dis-
claimer"). Social theorists and sociologists occasionally focus on disclaimers, using the term in ways
generally compatible with the way the term is developed below. See, e.g., John P. Hewitt & Randall
Stokes, Disclaimers, 40 AM. Soc. REv. 1, 3 (1975) (stating that "a disclaimer is a verbal device em-
ployed to ward off and defeat in advance doubts and negative typifications which may result from
intended conduct"); Maryann Overstreet & George Yule, Formulaic Disclaimers, 33 J. PRAGMATICS
45, 48 (2001) (describing disclaimers used by their speakers as "an effort to ... render potentially
problematic actions... meaningful, and ... define such actions as an irrelevant basis for a reassess-
ment of the speaker's established identity"). One will occasionally notice throughout the unclear
boundary lines between disclaimers on the one hand and disclosures--or even, in some cases, warn-
ings--on the other: for example, "not to be taken internally."
3. See infra Section IV.A.
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books.4 Disclaimers may also be thought of as a remedy for compelled
speech, or as themselves an instance of compelled speech.5 In addition,
commercial speech 6 is a fertile source of disclaimer problems, as in com-
mercial7 advertising by professionals,8 the marketing of securities, 9 and the
making of health claims regarding dietary food supplements.' 0
For further perspective, this article will also refer to disclaimers in spe-
cific 1 business and commercial contexts involving employment contract
laws, 2 commercial and consumer implied warranty and tort disclaimer 13
cases,14 and various sorts of implied warranty of residential habitability
cases. 15
These various contexts hardly exhaust the scope of disclaimers in the
law. The goal of this article, however, is not to compile a complete tax-
onomy-as though ambitiously collecting species of butterflies-but to
establish a foundation sufficient to make plausible descriptive and norma-
tive claims about disclaimers in the law.
Briefly, the conclusion will be that the law should rebuttably presume
that disclaimers-both their text or terms-should not be given significant
legal weight in their own right, apart from the relevant surrounding cir-
cumstances, social conflicts, power relationships, independent rules, and
other considerations of public policy. The reasons for this skeptical gener-
al result will emerge gradually below. For now, part of the argument can
be anticipated by noticing that typically, legal disclaimers arise as a con-
4. See infra Section IV.B.
5. See infra Section IV.C.
6. For an introduction to some general commercial speech regulation principles, if of uncertain
future stability, see Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
7. The dignitary concerns associated with political speech may sometimes be present in more
commercial contexts.
8. See infra Section IV.D.
9. See infra Section IV.E.
10. See infra Section W.F.
11. At a more general level, it may sometimes be hard to see why one genuinely freely bargained for
contractual term should be singled out among other freely bargained for terms and thought of as a
distinct "disclaimer," unlike any other bargained for qualification or concession on either side. See
generally Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1033 (2006); Randy E.
Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627 (2002); Todd D. Rakoff, The Law
and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235 (2006).
12. See infra Section IV.G.
13, See infra Section I.H.
14. For our purposes, these distinct theories and contexts can be treated together.
15. See infra Section IV.I. These contexts could of course be multiplied. Consider one spouse's
classic published disclaimer of liability for newly incurred debts of the other spouse. Should the courts
in such cases focus on matters like conspicuousness, clarity, or actual knowledge of the disclaimer, or
instead on the underlying policy issues? See, e.g., Trident Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Evans, 454 S.E.2d 343,
347-48 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (noting historical shifts in power relations between spouses); Med. Bus.
Assoc., Inc. v. Steiner, 183 A.D.2d 86, 91-92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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sciously strategized move-often an attempt to exonerate, to reassure or
allay suspicion, or to shift the burdens of a risk-in a "game" between per-
haps unequal players.
Normally, a disclaimer implies some sort of pre-existing tension for
which it is meant to address. Disclaimers arise in the context of power
relationships, varied conflicts of interest, and for strategic purposes, all of
which may implicate questions of public policy and legal values. These
underlying questions cannot be meaningfully addressed by any judicial
reading of the text or terms of the disclaimer itself. The courts should in-
stead be asked to treat the litigated disclaimer merely as an invitation to
consider the underlying relevant circumstances, values, conflicts, power
relationships, rules, and public policy considerations apart from the dis-
claimer itself.
Thus, it would be detrimental to recommend that courts somehow in-
terpret the language of the disclaimer and, on that basis, either give or
refuse effect to the disclaimer's terms. Instead, courts should look more
directly to the underlying power relationships, conflicts, and the public and
private interests at stake in the adjudication. Courts may, in the process,
utilize both broad principles and narrowly specific judgment under the
facts. This article will begin by exploring the idea of legal disclaimers and
some of the logic of the position stated above. The arguments will then be
developed in a variety of more concrete and illustrative legal contexts.
II. WHAT COULD DISCLAIMERS MEAN?
The idea of a legal disclaimer should be something that, in litigation,
merely sets in motion a judicial inquiry into related underlying matters.
There is a need, of course, to develop some ability to recognize a legal
disclaimer. It is helpful to begin by thinking about some familiar disclai-
mers. One might announce, for example, that past results are no guarantee
of future performance, that a party is not responsible for your debts or for
damage to your vehicle or for items stolen therefrom, that no animals were
injured in the making of a movie, that any resemblance between a literary
character and any living person is purely coincidental, that your gas mi-
leage may vary from some posted standard, that someone's weight loss
program results may not be typical, that your views may not be those of
station management, or that your sending an e-mail inquiry does not estab-
lish an attorney-client relationship.
Typically, legal disclaimers presume an underlying tension of some
sort. Generally, a disclaimer tells some audience that some other text or
circumstance does not mean or imply what one might otherwise think.
Disclaimers usually warn against such apparently reasonable inferences
Vol. 7, No. I
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without themselves offering any independent reasonable grounds. They
are thus typically "bare," and not self-justifying in cautioning against any
inference that might be drawn from the pre-existing evidence.
Where disclaimers do try to justify themselves, they are often subject
in that respect to contested and conflicting interpretation. Nevertheless,
disclaimers seek to somehow affect the rights, statuses, opportunities,
risks, and costs at stake. The underlying tension in question may take var-
ious forms-including, for example, the form of popular confusion. One
court has thus argued that "[d]isclaimers are a favored way of alleviating
consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship."'' 6
The main problem that generally arises is that the relationship between
the text or terms of the disclaimer and the underlying tension is more or
less indeterminate or reasonably contestable. 7 It might be said that it is
the underlying social circumstances themselves that are contestable, or else
that the disclaimer itself is indeterminate or essentially contestable in its
meaning, value, and implications. After all, a disclaimer typically tries to
discourage us from adopting an otherwise more or less reasonable infe-
rence in light of underlying circumstances.
In rare cases, the text or terms of a disclaimer may, on their face, ap-
pear simply implausible or plainly unjust and unenforceable. But even in
such a case, those terms are likely being used to infer something about the
underlying power relationships and conflicting interests. Courts that focus
on the disclaimer, or on its text or terms, are as likely to impose their own
preconceptions on the disclaimer as to interpret the disclaimer itself in
some uniquely appropriate and beneficial way. Further evidence of how
judicial interpretation of disclaimers in particular is typically more difficult
than judicial interpretation of various kinds of texts in general will be re-
vealed below.
To understand the special problems of interpreting disclaimers, it is
helpful to think of the ways in which disclaimers are commonly utilized.
Following a movie scene which depicts animals in jeopardy, for example, a
disclaimer may inform us that no animals were actually injured. Other
disclaimers-such as the scholarly author's disclaimer-may seek to steer
official or unofficial reactions, or perhaps even directly allocate risks and
burdens. Disclaimers may have many audiences, including the parties
themselves, interested spectators in general, potential regulators, potential
litigants in general, and reviewing courts. In some cases, the identities of
the real author or authors, sponsors, or endorsers of a disclaimer may
16. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1983).
17. See, e.g., Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., No. 01 C 9389, 2004 WL 532717, at
*4-5 (N.D. Ul1. Feb. 26, 2004).
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themselves be contested; we may not know for whom the disclaimer
speaks.
It is important to note that disclaimers-especially litigated disclai-
mers-are rarely seen in the absence of some sort of relevant underlying
group tension, whether suppressed or overt.'8 If the standard scholarly
author's disclaimer is sometimes thought to be unnecessary, 19 it is because
there is a well established convention for sensible policy reasons, in which
controversial theses are not imputed to readers of such. In other cases, a
disclaimer seeks to change, deny, distance, or characterize a reality-
perhaps a legal reality-in some way that may deserve to be controversial.
Disclaiming the consequences of one's own negligence,2 ° for example, or
the government disclaiming its endorsement of religion through other
acts,21 are typical disclaimers that occur against the background of a rele-
vant underlying tension. Almost without exception, disclaimers are aimed
at either avoiding relevant litigation entirely, or at attaining a ruling in ac-
cordance with the preferences of the dominant author or authors of the
disclaimer. For this reason, it might be said that every disclaimer is merely
a purported disclaimer until it somehow becomes effective.
Depending on the particular interpreter, a disclaimer will necessarily
seem more or less plausible. Suppose a contemporary performance artist
disclaims any intent to insult or scandalize anyone through a particular art
exhibit. Some interpreters may find the disclaimer sincere and plausible,
others less so. Or suppose a government displays religious objects, but
disclaims any intent to promote either a particular religion or religion in
general.22 Interpreters, including courts, may find any such disclaimer
more or less legitimate. Or an attorney's disclaimer, following an adver-
tisement, of any "implication regarding the quality of legal services ' 23 of-
fered may, according to different reasonable interpretations, again be more
or less credible.24 There can certainly be no general certainty as to how
disclaimers will be interpreted, or of their legal effects.
Disclaimers in the legal context flourish for several reasons. There is
always the chance that the disclaimer will be credited by someone having
independent credibility, authority, force, or weight, typically in a direction
preferred by the party driving the disclaimer. Crucially amongst those who
18. See id. (analyzing a disclaimer against consequential damages, where tension existed as to what
is sufficiently conspicuous under the U.C.C. to disclaim the remedy).
19. See supra note 1.
20. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Section IV.B.
22. See infra Sections IV.B-C.
23. IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(d)(4) (2007).
24. For the cited language in an adjudicated case, see, for example, In re Anonymous, 689 N.E.2d
442,444 (Ind. 1997).
Vol. 7, No. I
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may thus attribute independent weight to the disclaimer-apart from the
broader relevant circumstances-may be a court, with the power to bin-
dingly interpret and give legal effect to its preferred reading of the disclai-
mer.
More subtly, some courts may appreciate and actually value the sheer
contestability of typical legal disclaimers, along with the manipulability of
the disclaimer analysis and its judicial outcomes. 25 Other courts, recogniz-
ing the underlying tension or potential conflict that gives rise to a disclai-
mer in the first place, will sense the openness of the judicial possibilities.
There may well be a defensible judicial interpretation of the disclaimer that
resolves the underlying tension in accordance with judicial preferences.
Such courts might thus be in no hurry to abandon a manipulable process of
judicial interpretation regarding disclaimers.
The conflicts and uncertainties underlying disclaimer cases do not
mean that an outcome in any disclaimer case is better than any other.
Courts should, however, recognize that a typical disclaimer is "bare," in
the sense that it does not present grounds within itself to determine its own
credibility, or at best offers only inherently contestable grounds.26 The
disclaimer operates against a disclaimed inference that we presumably
have some reason to accept; if there were not some reason to accept what is
being disclaimed, there would be little reason for the disclaimer.
Courts should thus recognize that typically, a disclaimer does not make
an unequivocal or determinate case for itself, or even establish its own
meaning. It is a calling into question of what is disclaimed. The disclai-
mer should be seen by the court as merely setting the litigated case in mo-
tion. The substantial grounds for actually deciding the case one way or
another--or for accepting one theory of the case over another-lie not in
the text or terms of the disclaimer, but rather outside the disclaimer in the
relevant underlying facts, circumstances, conflicts and power relations,
legal rules, and policies.
A typical disclaimer, especially in cases likely to be litigated, is a stra-
tegic move, and sometimes27 a legally self-conscious, manipulative one.
Disclaimers are thus typically both responsive and anticipatory. Judges
should consider disclaimers, when litigated, merely as invitations to in-
25. See infra Section IV.C (providing, for an example of inescapable contestability and practical
arbitrariness, disclaimers in the Establishment Clause context generally in the setting of public school
textbooks discussing evolutionary theory).
26. See Streips v. LTV Corp., 216 A.D.2d 923, 926 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("The bare disclaimer
that defendants had not prejudged plaintiff does not necessarily erase that defamatory implication.").
27. It seems fair to guess that against the background of so many recent and well-publicized Estab-
lishment Clause cases, there is a reasonable chance that any new disclaimer in this context will amount
to a self-conscious, calculated, strategic move in a politicized litigation game, whatever else it may also
represent. See infra Sections IV.B-C.
2008
PIERCE LA W REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 1
quire into the legal and policy merits of the underlying circumstances. The
disclaimer itself will usually somehow reflect the relevant power relation-
ships amongst the parties, which the court may or may not want to vali-
date, given the interests and policies at stake.
For discussion purposes, a disclaimer may initially be thought of as an
attempt to warn against--or even rule out-some sort of otherwise more or
less plausible independent inference, or other reaction. This preliminary
understanding of a disclaimer will generally suffice. It does not corres-
pond perfectly with all legal usages, whether formal28 or more casual. 29
However, there is enough of a preliminary sense of disclaimers in the law
to now further explore the distinctive problems associated with such dis-
claimers. These problems are especially acute in the case of litigated dis-
claimers, and will not take as severe a form in most other general textual
expressions.3°
III. SOME PROBLEMS WITH TEXTS IN GENERAL AND WITH DISCLAIMERS
IN PARTICULAR
Certain forms of literary and social theory shed light on some of the
distinctive problems associated with disclaimers. First, it may be helpful
to examine an analogy. The philosopher W.B. Gallie famously suggested
that some concepts, including those of democracy and freedom, are "essen-
28. Some statements or actions that the law calls "disclaimers" will not qualify as disclaimers for
our purposes. For example, a disclaimer in patent law or in the law of estate planning is roughly a
timely and unequivocal substantive repudiation of a specified particular interest. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 496 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "disclaimer"). A disclaimer as understood by estate law is
generally effective as a legal matter where the necessary elements of the disclaimer are present. Id. at
496-97; see also RONALD A. BRAND & WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE PLANNING: A
GUtDE TO THEIR EFFECTIVE USE 1 n.1 (1990) ("The law is certainly not so absurd as to force a man to
take an estate against his will." (quoting Townson v. Tickell, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576-77
(K.B.))); S. Alan Medlin, An Examination of Disclaimers Under UPC Section 2-801, 55 ALB. L. REV.
1233, 1271, 1281 (1992) (discussing waiver of right to disclaim, and the effect of accepting any bene-
fits from the interest purportedly disclaimed).
29. The law sometimes refers to what would normally be thought of as a disclosure-as in publicly
disclosing or revealing one's identity-as a "disclaimer." For discussion of this arguable confusion of
disclosures and disclaimers, see Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 350, 358 (7th Cir. 2004). Other cases
further illustrate the election law and First Amendment contexts. See Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004);
HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, 691 (Tex. 2007).
30. On the other hand, there may be even less reason for courts to focus on the language and subs-
tantive textual messages, including a written response to a kidnapper, the language of a medical expe-
riment consent form signed by a prisoner, or of a coerced confession. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (discussing the grounds for finding a confession coerced, as well as the
voluntariness of a Miranda waiver); see also Additional Protections Pertaining to Biomedical and
Behavioral Research Involving Prisoners as Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.301 (2006).
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tially contested concepts."'" Gallie argued that "there are disputes ...
which are perfectly genuine: which, though not resolvable by argument of
any kind, are nonetheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and
evidence.32
It is certainly not suggested that the idea of a disclaimer is itself an es-
sentially contested concept. The problem with disclaimers is not that some
of us think that the idea of a disclaimer means one thing, systematically,
while others think that it means, or should mean, something crucially dif-
ferent. Instead, one should seek only to borrow some of the flavor of Pro-
fessor Gallie's account regarding the struggle in practice over essentially
contested concepts.
Even if it can be agreed in general on what a disclaimer is, it is typical
to find contrasting attitudes toward a particular disclaimer: complex related
arguments; potentially conflicting characterizations of the relevant cir-
cumstances and policies; unsettledness in an approach to the disclaimer,
even where certain "easy" or uncontroversial cases are presented; and a
sense that the potential areas of dispute regarding the disclaimer are of a
deep or structural character, even if the occasion for the dispute seems
transient. Following Gallie, the contest over the disclaimer seems dualis-
tic33 in form.3 4 It is not necessary to view disputes over disclaimers either
as reflecting some form of group relativism, 35 or as grounded only in ver-
bal confusion and superficial misunderstanding. 36
More generally, it is true of disclaimers-at least as much as of texts in
general-that the meaning for readers will depend upon the assumptions
they bring to bear37 as individuals or as members of some interpreting
group.38 These groups may well differ in social position, power, status,
31. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 169
(1956).
32. Id. There is substantial literature deriving from Gallie's work. For a recent critique, see David
Collier et al., Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications, 11 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 211
(2006).
33. Admittedly, it may be difficult to separate any distinctive dualism in disclaimers from the gener-
al tendency of adversary litigation to reduce disputes to dualistic oppositions.
34. See Collier et al., supra note 32, at 212 (incorporating a number of similar elements used in
Gallie's approach).
35. Id.
36. See Gallic, supra note 31, at 188.
37. See Stanley E. Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordi-
nary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 625, 626 (1978) ("[W]hat anyone sees is not independent of his verbal and mental categories
but is in fact a product of them . ). To the extent this is true, it may well be true even of judges
interpreting litigated disclaimers.
38. See JAY L. LEMKE, TEXTUAL POLITICS: DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL DYNAMICS 9 (1995) ("all
meanings are made within communities and ... the analysis of meaning should not be separated from
the social, historical, cultural, and political dimensions of these communities"); Steven Randall, Fish v.
Fish: Review of Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communi-
2008
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and interests. The meanings of texts will in this sense be social,39 and will
reflect both the correspondence and the conflicts-overt and suppressed-
of social group interests. 4° Quite understandably, then, "multiplicity and
indeterminacy of interpretation 'A should often be expected.
Given the many differences in power and interests among interpreting
groups, one should expect some of the conflicting interpretations to be
dominant, even if contested,42 other interpretations to be negotiated, even if
unstably so, and yet other interpretations to be more or less oppositional
and subject to official disapproval.43 Thus, in general,
the meanings and interests of both dominant and non-dominant
[groups] act together in proportions that are not predetermined, to
constitute the forms and possibilities of meaning at every level.
We do not assume that resistance is always successful or potent:
but nor do we take it for granted ... that resistance is always effor-
tlessly incorporated and rendered non-significant.44
Whether one finds these characterizations to be descriptive of all sorts of
texts is, of course, far beyond the scope of this article. Their applicability
to typical cases of litigated disclaimers is of greater concern.
ties, 12 DIACRrrIcS 49, 51 (1982) (explaining that constraints on interpretations of texts "proceed not
from stable, objective properties of the text, but from norms and assumptions shared with other mem-
bers of an interpretive community.").
39. See, e.g., John Dewey, Peirce's Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning, 43 J. PHIL.
85, 94 (1946) (recognizing that no valid theory of linguistic signs can escape being rooted in social
phenomena).
40. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26 (1989) (discussing the role of cooperation
in linguistic discourse); ROBERT HODGE & GUNTHER KRESS, SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 266 (1988) (empha-
sizing interpretive contradiction in the context of attempts to control conflicting interests through text
and interpretation); Dewey, supra note 39, at 94; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the
Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 1179, 1190 (1990) (discussing philosopher Paul Grice on
the study of meaning as often derived from the social setting).
41. Lynn Mario T. Menzes de Souza, Language, Culture, Multimodality and Dialogic Emergence, 6
LANGUAGE & INTERCULTURAL COMM. 107, 107 (2006); see also UMBERTO ECO, THE ROLE OF THE
READER: EXPLORATIONS IN THE SEMIOTICS OF TEXTS 22 (2d ed. 1984) (stating "an ideological bias can
lead a critical reader to make a given text say more than it apparently says"); JOHN R. SEARLE,
EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 5 (1979) (showing differences
in the status of both speaker and listener in affecting meaning).
42. See HELEN DAVIS, UNDERSTANDING STUART HALL 46-47 (2004) (discussing Hall's theory on
the often unstable and sometimes negotiated-among-unequals quality of some interpretations);
REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 48 (Stuart Hall ed.,
1997) (explaining the development of related ideas in general contexts); JAMES PROCTOR, STUART
HALL 26 (2004); RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE 113 (1977) (defining dominance
as "never either total or exclusive").
43. Seesupra note 41.
44. HODGE & KRESS, supra note 40, at 8.
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The language of disclaimers is thus not merely purposive,'45 but typi-
cally46 conflict-based, power-reflective, and strategic in distinctive ways.47
More so than texts in general, disclaimers are directly reflective of con-
scious social power relationships and at least partially conflicting interests.
Disclaimers cannot be read by courts in some conflict-neutral way, even if
a court finds a particular disclaimer to be entirely unambiguous.
The crucial problem in judicially responding to disclaimers, then, is
not one of textual ambiguity. Many disclaimers are as unambiguous as the
non-disclaimer texts that courts are rightly expected to focus on and interp-
ret under their own terms.48 Even if one were to choose to call most dis-
claimers ambiguous, they would still be no more ambiguous than many
other texts, including other legal texts.
The lack of uniform ambiguity of disclaimers should not be surprising.
If, as is suggested, disclaimers reflect underlying power relationships in
circumstances of conflicting interests, one should expect many disclaimers
to be no more ambiguous than other social texts. A dominant group may
or may not find that an ambiguous disclaimer best reflects its interests. An
ambiguous or unambiguous disclaimer may be more or less unilaterally
imposed, or else negotiated amongst some of the directly affected parties.
The crucial problem underlying judicial responses to disclaimers is
thus not distinctive ambiguity, but rather that a disclaimer's text reflects
the complex, subtle, or disguised underlying power relationships, conflict-
ing interests, and strategic purposes that have produced that text.49  For a
45. See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 99 (2d ed. 1996) ("When
we understand the 'intentions' of a piece of language, we interpret it as being in some sense oriented,
structured to achieve certain effects.").
46. "Disclaimers" that arise before any potential conflict has been envisioned would count either as
less strategic, less manipulative, less self-conscious disclaimers, or as partial, inadvertent, or even not
true disclaimers at all. For a relatively close case even in the context of religious symbols on public
land, see Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), which involved a wooden cross
erected by VFW on public land in 1934, accompanied by photographs and signs stating: "The Cross,
Erected in Memory of the Dead of All Wars." It can be assumed that such displays might well have
been less likely to be subject to Establishment Clause litigation in 1934 than in more recent decades.
47. See C.K. OGDEN ET AL., THE MEANING OF MEANING 17 (Harcourt 1989) (1923) ("Another
variety of verbal ingenuity.. . is the deliberate use of symbols to misdirect the listener.").
48. In various contexts, the Court has willingly interpreted the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) ("Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are
well developed and familiar.").
49. A disclaimer does not arise for practical, cultural, or technical reasons, even though conflicting
interests and strategic purposes may be present. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 576-77 (1995). In Hurley, the Court contrasted the greater feasibility of
broadcaster versus individual speaker viewpoint disclaimers in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994). Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576-77. The Court also controversially con-
trasted the supposedly unproblematic disclaimer possibilities for shopping mall owners with respect to
random unscreened mall speakers in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 86-87
(1980). For an even less realistic proposed disclaimer, see Wigg v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5,
382 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2004), which involved an audience of second and third grade students and
2008
PIERCE LA WREVIEW
court to either validate or invalidate any disclaimer is to inescapably take
some non-neutral stance on the status and exercise of those power relation-
ships. A court should, therefore, address the broad moral or public policy-
based value and character of those power relationships in the context of the
contested disclaimer.
The terms or text of a disclaimer can hardly begin to validate or invali-
date the underlying power relationships and the exercise of power embo-
died in the disclaimer; they can only serve to introduce the court to the
substantive public policy interests and concerns that should determine the
outcome of the judicial case.50 A judicial decision that focuses, formalisti-
cally, on the text or terms of the disclaimer-rather than on underlying
power relationships, conflicts, and values-will unavoidably be substan-
tively arbitrary, whether or not it validates the disclaimer.
Sometimes a dominant party overreaches and imposes a disclaimer
that, on its face, strikes a court as patently unjust and violative of sound
public policy.5' Even in such "easy" cases, the court should view the dis-
claimer's terms as suggesting the state of the underlying power relation-
ships and conflicting interests.52 It is those power relationships, interests,
and the public policy responses thereto that matter. The enforceability of a
disclaimer, whether facially appealing to a judge or not, must be deter-
mined by some sort of judicial or legislative consideration of the circums-
tances beyond the text. The disclaimer itself is not typically cogent evi-
dence of those policies. The cases discussed below illustrate when a self-
conscious strategic point of a disclaimer is evident.53
explained that a teacher conducting a religious club meeting in a public school library-only minutes
after the last school class-is acting only in her capacity as a private citizen, or at least not as an official
representative of the school. It seems unlikely that most second or third grade students could read such
a disclosure, or grasp the distinction involved.
50. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bradley, No. 2070574, 2008 WL 4892150, at *7 (Ala. Civ. App. Nov. 14,
2008) (finding no violation of public policy when disclaiming any right to recover mental-anguish
damages).
51. As an extreme hypothetical, consider a disclaimer by which an apparently dominant party
sought to avoid any responsibility for its own malicious acts in exchange for no meaningful considera-
tion. See Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Dagmar's Marina, 161 P.3d 1029, 1031 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (dis-
cussing the controversy that exists when a disclaimer attempts to exculpate a party from liability for
negligent injury).
52. As a matter of the underlying social reality, a disclaimer that seems objectionable on its face
may be justifiable in light of circumstances not suggested by the disclaimer itself. Perhaps some con-
cession or payment has elsewhere been made, or the apparently unfair terms advantage the burdened
party in some other context. This holds whether the disclaimer has been formally agreed to or is in-
stead apparently unilateral.
53. See infra Sections IV.B-C.
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Surprisingly, a disclaimer often provides little insight into who has au-
thored it.54  It is to be expected that a disclaimer itself will not indicate
which among the several affected parties has endorsed, resisted, or been
skeptical of the disclaimer. However, it is also common for disclaimers to
leave even their own author or authors unspecified." In some cases, lack
of clarity as to the identity of the author may reflect the strategic aims un-
derlying the disclaimer.
Perhaps the most important context in which the identity of the dis-
claimer's author may be unclear-if not actually concealed-involves
speech arguably attributable to the government. To create a meaningful
democracy,56 the voice of government must be clearly distinguished from
the voice of less powerful 57 private speakers.58
Even a clear disclaimer may not establish the public or private author-
ship of particular speech.59 Disclaimers, especially those made or man-
dated by the government,60 may in some cases deserve little credence. But
the more basic problem is whether the disclaimer amounts to, at least in
part, government speech or not. Often, courts do not know-and cannot
tell after careful examination of the disclaimer-the identity of the author.
Issues regarding disclaimers and compelled speech are further ad-
dressed below.61  For the moment, consider the possibility of govemmen-
54. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377, 1384 (2001) (raising general concern over the risk of "deception about who authored a
message").
55. Id.
56. Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government
Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REV. 961,989-91 (1984).
57. Id. at 990-91.
58. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
ExPREsSION IN AMERICA (1983) (discussing the broader issues posed by government speech); Gia B.
Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 984 (2005) (asserting
that "federal, state, and local government entities and officials may engage in pseudonymous or ano-
nymous communications more often than we might imagine"); Frederick Schauer, Is Government
Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983) (reviewing YuDOF, supra); Steven Shifftin, Gov-
ernment Speech and the Falsification of Consent, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF,
supra).
59. To note the disagreement on this point within the Court, see generally Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), which discussed student speech subsi-
dized by mandatory student activity fees according to state university criteria. In particular, the Court
reasoned that a required disclaimer stating that subsidized private speech is not that of the state univer-
sity student association cannot be accepted as a valid and sufficient disclaimer. Id. at 229. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Souter emphasized, "Unlike the majority, I would not hold that the mere
fact that the University disclaims speech as its own expression takes it out of the scope of our jurispru-
dence on government directed speech." Id. at 241 (Souter, J., concurring).
60. For discussion of the distinction between speech by or attributable to the government, and
speech by others that is compelled by the government, see generally Note, The Curious Relationship
Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411 (2004).
This proposition is discussed more fully infra Section V.C.
61. See infra Sections IV.B-C.
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tally required disclaimers in the context of governmentally subsidized pub-
lic broadcasting. 62 The government in such cases has taken an interest in
discouraging the belief "that the broadcaster's editorials reflect the official
view of the government., 63  A governmentally required disclaimer is
thought to solve the problem by announcing that station editorials do not
reflect the views of the official government or any other station funding
source. 64
But a disclaimer that is compelled by the party-in this case the gov-
ernment-and is suspected of influencing the broadcaster's speech must be
suspicious. Such a disclaimer gives the courts a reason to investigate the
underlying power relationships, conflicts, strategic aims, and policies at
stake. These disclaimers can hardly be self-validating. Consider, in this
context, the colorful analysis of Justice Stevens: "This solution would be
laughable were it not so Orwellian: the answer to the fact that there is a
real danger that the editorials are really Government propaganda is for the
Government to require the station to tell the audience that it is not propa-
ganda at all!", 65
Disclaimers by the government or governmentally inspired private par-
ties raise many issues. The only point addressed here is that even the most
careful examination of the text or terms of the disclaimer cannot always
reveal which party is the disclaimer's author. Whether the disclaimer
represents some sort of negotiated compromise--or reflects one degree or
another of conflicting interests, inequality, or coercion-are closely related
but separate problems.
How should a court go about determining whether a disclaimer was au-
thored by the government or a private party? In this context, courts should
not focus on the text and terms of the disclaimer, but rather on ascertaining
the disclaimer's author and real social meaning from available sources.
Such courts should instead launch an open-ended inquiry into anything that
might shed light on the real authorship of the disclaimer. But many courts,
understandably, have preferred a more structured and limited-but still
complex-inquiry.66
The courts have faced general problems when distinguishing between
government speech (or government-sponsored speech) and genuinely pri-
62. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
63. Id. at 395.
64. Id
65. Id. at 417 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In certain related contexts, some justices are more
optimistic about the effective role of disclaimers. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 829 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("petitioner offer[ed] no explanation why a
simple disclaimer in the brochure would not suffice to achieve the Government's interest in avoiding
the appearance of support").
66. See infra text accompanying note 59.
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vate speech approved by the government. The most commonly used judi-
cial test in this context consists of four factors, none of which focus on the
text or terms of the speech itself.67 This may include a physical sign, a
written message, or a portion of a broadcast. In the context of a physical
sign involving a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments,68 for
example, one court considered and adopted four factors, which questioned:
(1) whether the central purpose of the sign was to promote the
views of the municipality; (2) whether the municipality exercised
editorial control over the content of the sign; (3) whether the literal
speaker was an employee of the municipality; and (4) whether ul-
timate responsibility for the content of the sign rested with the mu-
nicipality. 69
It is unnecessary to focus on precisely these four factors when trying to
judicially determine the authors of a disclaimer. The factors have to be
adopted in cases of joint responsibility. At a general level, the court's
focus on underlying issues of purpose, control, and responsibility is well-
advised. In any event, courts should in look underneath, or beyond, the
disclaimer itself.
IV. SETTING ASIDE THE DISCLAIMER ITSELF AND ASKING ABOUT THE
UNDERLYING POWER RELATIONS, CONFLICTS, AND PUBLIC POLICIES:
SOME TYPICAL EXAMPLES
A. Establishment Clause Disclaimers in General
Few areas of the law illustrate the risks of focusing on the text or terms
of disclaimers-as distinct from the underlying social and policy reali-
ties-more clearly than their treatment in the Establishment Clause con-
text.
It would be overwhelming to survey here all of the various approaches
to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 70 For illustration, this analysis will
begin with the familiar Lemon test, in which the challenged practice "must
67. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2002).
68. Id. at 998.
69. Id. at 1004; see also Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085,
1095 (8th Cit. 2000) (explaining that public radio station's underwriting acknowledgments were deter-
mined to be governmental rather than private speech).
70. For references to three more or less distinct approaches-including the Lemon test, the en-
dorsement test, and the coercion test-see Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v. Freiler, 530 U.S.
1251, 1251 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir.
2002), rev'd on grounds of lack of standing, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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have a secular... purpose; . . . its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally, the [practice] must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' 71 When
72one adds in alternative tests focusing on some sort of idea of coercion, or
governmental endorsement, 73 a sense of current Establishment Clause juri-
sprudence can be understood.
Directly relevant, however, is the sheer faith of some judges in the
power of a disclaimer, absent investigation into the underlying power rela-
tionships, actual and potential conflicts, and relevant policy concerns. The
problem is that disclaimers in such contexts tell us little about the Lemon
test elements, coercion, or government endorsement. The focus should be
on the relevant underlying circumstances, rather than on the words of the
disclaimer.
Certainly, disclaimers in Establishment Clause cases can be either sin-
cere or strategic. Some disclaimers may be manipulative or a form of
propaganda. 74 Disclaimers may or may not accurately reflect any underly-
ing social reality. Some judges, however, take Establishment Clause dis-
claimers at face value.
Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's apparent belief that any appro-
priate disclaimer would have reversed the outcome in Lee v. Weisman,
which concerned an otherwise unconstitutional general religious invoca-
tion before a public school commencement ceremony.75 In the face of the
otherwise objectionable religious invocation, the school authorities need
only present, in his opinion, a relevant disclaimer by "mak[ing] clear that
anyone who abstains from screaming in protest does not necessarily partic-
ipate in the prayers. ' 76 More precisely, in Justice Scalia's view, such a
disclaimer might take the form of "an announcement, or perhaps a written
insertion at the beginning of the graduation program, to the effect that,
while all are asked to rise for the invocation and benediction, none is com-
pelled to join in them nor will be assumed, by rising, to have done so. ' 77
71. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
72. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992); supra note 69.
73. See supra note 69.
74. See generally EDWARD BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA 52 (Ig Publ'g 2005) (1928) ("Modem propa-
ganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to
an enterprise, idea or group."); JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES
74-75 (Konrad Kellen & Jean Lerner trans., Vintage Books 1973) (1965). It is unnecessary here to
think of propaganda as enduring over time.
75. 505 U.S. at 644-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 645.
77. Id. But see Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311-12 (finding an essentially coerced attendance at a football
game and coerced prayer participation by those in attendance, further stating that "even if we regard
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There is much to say in response here. Importantly, it must be asked
how one can be sure that a potentially self-serving governmentally com-
posed disclaimer will carefully track any distinction between an unspeci-
fied idea of coercion-including peer and public pressure on this cere-
monial occasion-and merely being officially but harmlessly "asked" to
78perform some act in unison.
The point is not to prefer one understanding of coercion79 to another,
generally or in this context; nor is it to conclude that under the circums-
tances of Lee, anyone was or was not coerced. This also means that there
is no claim to be able to say whether a disclaimer that denied any coercion
in Lee would be accurate or not.
Instead, the point is that a governmental disclaimer of any coercion, or
of any intent to proselytize or promote religion, can hardly begin to solve
the constitutional problems or tell us about the underlying power relation-
ships, conflicts, and policy concerns in Lee. A disclaimer may be, as has
been shown,80 merely a willful exercise of power by a dominant party that
overrides and obscures the relevant underlying truths.
As a further complication, disclaimers in religious display contexts-
whether conspicuous or multitudinous8 '-may call attention less to them-
selves than to the physical scene in general, the government's role and
presence, or the portion of the display thought to create the Establishment
Clause problem, thereby backfiring. 82 Such disclaimers still do not reveal
the genuine power relationships and conflicts, but may invite judicial ma-
nipulation. Disclaimers may reflect unilateral power, may deny the ob-
vious,83 may seem Orwellian, 84 or may seem to backfire. 85 The judicial
every high school student's decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary,... a pregame
prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship").
78. Arguably, such a disclaimer takes insufficient account of possible dissenting student free exer-
cise of religion elements at this point, beyond the Establishment Clause issues.
79. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE & METHOD 444 (Sidney Morgenbesser
et al. eds. 1969) (providing an alternative understanding of the idea of coercion); see also ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987); NoMos XVI: COERCION (J. Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds.
1972).
80. Supra notes 61-64.
81. See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chi., 827 F.2d 120, 128 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing a
nativity scene in City Hall surrounded by six disclaimer signs).
82. Id. at 125-26.
83. Id. at 128.
84. See supra text accompanying note 60. For a limited rejection of Orwellianism in interpreting
and reacting to government disclaimers, see ACLUof Kentucky v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098, 1104 (6th
Cir. 1990).
85. See Am. Jewish Cong., 827 F.2d at 125-26; see also Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d
1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that the city had to disclaim menorah sponsorship "so often that it
became ours in some people's minds").
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focus should be not on the detailed formal minutiae of disclaimers,86 but
instead on the underlying social realities. Only if courts or legislatures
meaningfully investigate these underlying realities can we begin to have
confidence that a disclaimer case is rightly decided. 87
Consider, for example, the alternative readings of a disclaimer accom-
panying the public display of a creche, menorah, and Christmas tree in
Allegheny v. ACLU. 88 The disclaimer associated with the menorah and the
Christmas tree referred to celebrating liberty,89 and to the theme of light.90
The Court's plurality opinion, while recognizing that some messages are
just too undeniable to disclaim plausibly,9' nonetheless understood the
disclaimer to confum that the display was not an endorsement or 3Promo-
tion of religion,92 but instead served to recognize cultural diversity.
One could easily read such a disclaimer as a manipulative attempt to
constitutionally legitimize a traditional religious message; a city could
easily recognize cultural diversity in some less overtly religiously tinged
way. The point, though, is not that courts should look at the disclaimer
itself as the key to deciding the constitutional case. A disclaimer cannot
tell us whether it reflects nearly universal secular community sentiment, or
was proverbially rammed down a minority's throats in an attempt to sanit-
ize unconstitutional motives and consequences. 94 Meanwhile, even the
questions of who is to be envisioned as reading and interpreting the dis-
claimer, and in what capacities, are unsolved judicial problems.95
86. To examine the sense of arbitrariness in judicial attempts to attach one or another sort of crcial
legal import to the disclaimer itself, see Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 794 n.2 (1995), which recognized the possible perceived inadequacy of disclaimers in particular
contexts. For an example of an inordinate judicial focus on fine-tuning the size, visibility, number, and
message of an unusually non-committal, ambiguous disclaimer, see McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716,
727-28 (2d Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
87. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing and
crediting the City's disclaimer of and dissociation from a Ten Commandments monument in a privately
owned portion of park). Contra id. at 706 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (stating that the disclaimer at the
monument was "an obvious sham," and no more effective than the Wizard's directive to "pay no atten-
tion to that man behind the curtain").
88. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). As has for decades been common, the opinions in this Establishment
Clause case seem fractured beyond what any obvious theory could account for.





94. For further examples of the remarkably variable capacity of a disclaimer to sanitize an apparent-
ly religious public display, see Hills v. Scottsdale Unified School District, 329 F.3d 1044, 1054-56 (9th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Much more broadly, see JOHN R. SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY:
REFLECTIONS ON FREE WILL, LANGUAGE, AND POLITICAL POWER 105 (2004), which states that "polit-
ical powers are ... in large part, linguistically constituted."
95. See. e.g., Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 487,495-96
n.2 (7th Cir. 2000). As merely one facet of the capacities of the reader problem, consider that in a
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B. Evolution Textbook Disclaimers as Themselves Posing the Establish-
ment Clause Problem
An unusual case is posed by disclaimers in the context of public school
textbooks discussing the theory of evolution. Here, presumably, a secular
evolutionary theory textbook by itself does not raise an Establishment
Clause issue. The problem arises only when the state introduces some sort
of separate oral or written disclaimer, with a range of possible meanings,
into the situation. 96 In this context, the state-mandated disclaimer does not
purport to solve or neutralize a preexisting Establishment Clause prob-
lem--the disclaimer itself is the problem.
If it is here true that the disclaimer is itself the problem, one cannot
make much progress by advising the courts to ignore the text and terms of
the disclaimer. It remains true even in this special context that courts
should focus on underlying power relationships, actual and potential con-
flicts, and relevant public policies in resolving the Establishment Clause
issue. To understand this, it may be helpful to imagine the evolution dis-
claimer being rewritten so as not to take the form of a disclaimer, but in-
stead of content seamlessly written into the textbook itself.97 The Estab-
lishment Clause issue might well remain, but without the element of a dis-
claimer. As the caselaw has developed, there is no absolute uniformity as
to the language of evolution textbook disclaimers. However, a typical such
disclaimer may read as follows: "This textbook contains material on evolu-
tion. Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding the origin of living things.
classroom Ten Commandments posting case, the statute required that in small print below the last
commandment shall appear a notation concerning the purpose of the display, as follows: "The secular
application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39
(1980) (per curiam). The Court referred to a trial court characterization of this disclaimer as "self-
serving," but did not ask whether a self-serving disclaimer could also still be valid, or whether typical
third and fourth grade students could be expected to make much of the disclaimer's language. Id. at 41.
96. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing
how the school board would insert a disclaimer in an attempt to avoid issues involving the teaching of
evolution).
97. Establishment Clause issues aside, governments, when thought of as speakers, have broad dis-
cretion in selecting, adopting, or bargaining for language in public school textbooks. See Chiras v.
Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 607-08 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that the Texas State Board of Education has
broad power to review textbooks and textbook material); see also Rebecca Tanglen, Comment, Local
Decisions, National Impact: Why the Public School Textbook Selection Process Should Be Viewpoint
Neutral, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (2007). But see Ass'n de Educacion Privada de P.R. v.
Garcia-Padilla, 490 F.3d 1, 12-14 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the state's power to select textbooks is a
threat to the First Amendment (citing Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in
School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88
CORNELL L. REv. 62, 111 (2002))).
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This material should be aproached with an open mind, studied carefully,
and critically considered."'
To adjudicate the permissibility of such disclaimers under the Estab-
lishment Clause, the courts would presumably apply one or more of the
tests referred to in the previous section. 99 Such courts might choose to
focus on the text of the disclaimer when applying whatever tests the courts
deemed appropriate. A court skeptical of the disclaimer might conclude
that referring to evolution as merely a theory amounts to religiously moti-
vated stigmatization. 00 Or perhaps a skeptical court might wonder why
the virtue of critical assessment should be officially mandated here, but not
elsewhere. In contrast, a court more sympathetic to the disclaimer might
focus on the undeniable truth that the theory of evolution is in some sense a
theory, and that critical thinking is a good thing in this context.
However, courts need not, and should not, focus on the text of the dis-
claimer in resolving the Establishment Clause issues. Judicial scrutiny of
the text itself is unlikely to be genuinely productive. Consider how the
disclaimer would read if it were drafted by school authorities whose sym-
pathies run entirely in favor of official religious proselytizing in public
schools. Given the body of Establishment Clause jurisprudence over the
past several decades, is it likely that even such a school board would draft
a disclaimer that simply overtly endorses religious creationism? Would
such a school board not more likely ask itself: how can we best phrase the
disclaimer in light of potential legal challenges under the current caselaw?
It should be expected that a religiously motivated'0 ' disclaimer--even if
envelope-pushing-will be no more overtly religious, textually, than a
prudent reading of the caselaw might support. Given the "gameability" of
Establishment Clause tests, one might expect "strategic" behavior from all
parties. °2  Even religiously motivated disclaimers should tend to stopsomewhere in a zone of Establishment Clause indeterminacy.' 3
98. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1324 (1 Ith Cir. 2006) (describing a disclai-
mer as a sticker affixed to textbook's inside front cover); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tan-
gipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S 1251, 1251 (2000) (No. 99-1625) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (providing a somewhat lengthier oral disclaimer to accompany every presentation of evolutionary
theory).
99. See supra Part V.A; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tangipahoa, 530 U.S 1251 (No.
99-1625).
100. Presumably, no other similarly corroborated theories in other textbooks evoke a similar disclai-
mer sticker.
101. Recall the significant secular purpose prong, deriving from Lemon v. Kurlzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612 (1971), and as applied in similar contexts thereafter.
102. See Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating how a "disclai-
mer may be sufficient to disassociate the City from private speech for purposes of the Establishment
Clause....").
103. While there are of course some rewards for aggressively reading the caselaw in one's favor, the
costs of litigation and the availability of reasonable attorneys' fees for a prevailing opposing party
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It should thus be normally expected that the text of even religiously
motivated disclaimers would present reasonably close cases based on cur-
rent caselaw. But this means that the apparently moderate and secularly
phrased text of the disclaimer will not accurately reflect the presumed reli-
gious purpose of the drafters of the disclaimer. Realistically, such disclai-
mers will, at this historical point, typically be drafted-and responded to-
strategically, with perhaps an eye toward bare compliance with the case-
law. 1°4
Rather than focusing on the text of such disclaimers, particularly if
they are likely to be strategically crafted to present favorable cases, courts
should apply Establishment Clause caselaw in light of the relevant underly-
ing social forces and circumstances. This is not to suggest that doing so
will be easier or will generate especially popular results. To at least some
degree, however, courts can recognize any politicized manipulation, tactic-
al evasion, strategic record-building, or self-conscious hypersensitivity 0 5
on one or both sides. As merely one general consideration, real political
power may be expressed more naturally by controlling the hundreds of
pages of actual content in a required textbook, with or without a disclaimer
sticker, rather than by controlling the content of a disclaimer that prefaces
hundreds of pages of required text with which one may disagree. 106 But as
a matter of political power at the level of typical citizens, belief in some
alternative to a purely naturalist evolutionary theory remains remarkably
well established. 10 7
suggest tempering the language of the disclaimer. For one source of attorneys' fees in constitutional
litigation against a public school board, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
104. Doubtless even at this point, a disclaimer could still be drafted naively, for local political pur-
poses, or from a sense of principle independent of judicial outcome. Again, however, the financial
costs of litigating an evolution disclaimer that does not arguably accommodate the caselaw are likely to
be high. For discussion of the problem of strategic drafting of the disclaimer, see Louis J. Virelli III,
Making Lemonade: A New Approach to Evaluating Evolution Disclaimers Under the Establishment
Clause, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423, 441 (2006).
105. See Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing outsidership versus
full membership, and perceptions thereof, in the local political community).
106. Historically, note the shift in the issue at stake from Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09
(1968)-involving the impermissibility of prohibiting the teaching of evolution-to Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987)-finding impermissibility in requiring that creation theory be taught
alongside evolutionary theory-to Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 766
(M.D. Pa. 2005)-finding impermissibility of teaching "intelligent design"-to typical contemporary
disclaimer cases.
107. While any particular poll question can be criticized, a belief that human beings were created
directly by God is apparently held by the majority of college graduates, Democrats, self-identified
liberals, adults between 18 and 54, Northeasterners, and Westerners, with a plurality of a random
sample of adults preferring that evolution, creationism, and intelligent design all be taught in the public
schools. See Harris Interactive, Inc., The Harris Poll #52: Nearly Two-thirds of U.S. Adults Believe
Human Beings Were Created by God (July 6, 2005),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=581; see also National Center for Science
Education, Public View of Creationism and Evolution Unchanged, Says Gallup (Nov. 19, 2004),
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C. Disclaimers and Compelled Citizen Speech
Sometimes even a sincere, clear, voluntary, and apparently relevant
disclaimer is unable to affect the legal outcome of a case. Consider the
circumstances of the classic compelled flag salute case, West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.'0 8 Compelled citizen speech, in the form
of a requirement that all public school students pledge allegiance and sa-
lute the flag-regardless of any conscientious scruples-was therein held
unconstitutional. 10 9 In Justice Jackson's words, "the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitu-
tional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control."' 10
As a rhetorical question, we might ask whether allowing the student
plaintiffs in Barnette to display any sort of freely composed conspicuous
disclaimer, unedited and unpunished by the school, would have changed
the outcome of the case. It is hard to imagine how it would. Yet such a
disclaimer could have clearly established-for all observers, and on the
plaintiffs' own terms-their precise views on the matters at stake.
The inadequacy of any disclaimer"' in that compelled speech context
may stem from several considerations: the disvalue of the remaining
coerced behavior; the remaining elements of government control; any so-
cial costs to dissenters for publicly adopting the disclaimer; the sheer in-
dignity of the coerced behavior; 112 and even the long-term risks to auto-
nomous thinking from recurring, coerced behavior. 1 3  The explanation,
http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/2004fUS/724_publicviewofcreationism and_11_19_2004.
asp (stating that 13% of respondents to the Gallup Poll agreed that "[h]uman beings have developed
over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process"); Pollin-
gReport.com, Science and Nature: Origin of Human Life (May 8-11, 2008),
http://www.pollingreport.com/science.htm.
108. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
109. See id. at 642.
110. Id.
11. The Court has suggested that a disclaimer, or a realistic opportunity for a disclaimer, may under
other circumstances at least help neutralize any threat to First Amendment values. See, e.g., PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (reasoning that a shopping center owner may dis-
claim any connection with a message spread by petitioners on the shopping center property).
112. One could argue that the dignity of the person is fundamental to freedom of speech as well as to
other constitutional values. See generally R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional
Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 527 (2006); R. George
Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U.
RICH. L. REv. 271 (2002).
113. Cf BLAISE PASCAL, PENStES 61 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., Penguin Books 1995) (1671) (sug-
gesting that repeated, ritualized actions, performed without or contrary to one's present belief, may
actually tend to promote beliefs congruent with one's repeated acts).
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though, matters less than recognition of the only quite modest role for dis-
claimers, actual or possible,' 14 in the compelled speech context.
The insignificance of any possible disclaimer can be seen as well in
Wooley v. Maynard,"5 where New Hampshire's requirement that passen-
ger vehicle plates display the state motto ("Live Free or Die") was invali-
dated. 1 6 Dissenting in the case, Justice Rehnquist observed that nothing
prevented those who reject such a motto from affixing to their bumper a
disclaimer of the required message,' which would in any event not be
imputed to any individual driver, precisely because of the recognized un-
iversality of the motto display requirement. 18
A disclaimer in such a case could indeed convey an objector's view-
point. So too, to some degree, might a letter to the editor or to one's state
representative, or any one of various other means of communication not
amounting to a disclaimer. But disclaiming a message does not undo the
inherent indignity of being forced, as a mere Kantian means," 9 to personal-
ly bear and disseminate the message. Whether any such disclaimer should
be given a particular legal status depends not upon the text of the disclai-
mer, but upon the underlying dynamics of power, dignity, autonomy, and
expression.
D. Compelled Disclaimers and Professional Advertising
Disclaimers are often legally required in an attempt to negate the risk
of what is thought to be at least potentially misleading professional adver-
tising. 20 In such cases, however, courts may often underestimate the po-
tential for mandatory disclaimers themselves to mislead some consumers.
The courts might be better advised to recognize that legislatively mandated
114. Also recall that in some contexts, a disclaimer may for technical or cultural reasons not seem
feasible. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (stating that "j]udicial standards under the
Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar").
115. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
116. Id. at 713.
117. Id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 721.
119. See supra note Ill and accompanying text. By analogy, declaring publicly that "I resent being
used" may indeed be an assertion of one's dignity, but there is certainly no guarantee that any such
declaration must somehow effectively undo the effects of being used.
120. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) (holding
that a state may require a disclaimer regarding attorney certification or specialization); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191,201-03 (1982) (holding that states may regulate misleading lawyer advertising by way of
disclaimer); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (stating that advertising claims
about the quality of legal services are misleading and may require a disclaimer).
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disclaimers can be the product of interest group influence121 as much as
that of disinterested reflection on the public interest.
Crucially, a state-required disclaimer can itself be actually or potential-
ly misleading-or worse, a disclaimer of some relevant and non-
misleading truth. 122 Legislatures in particular should typically resist the
temptation to mandate standard professional advertising disclaimers.
Courts should strike down such required disclaimers if the underlying con-
siderations so suggest, including where the disclaimers cannot be shown to
decrease overall consumer confusion. The more direct solution, typically,
should involve prohibiting the misleading advertising speech, as opposed
to the enforced bundling of misleading advertising speech with a potential-
ly deceptive and even dignity-impairing disclaimer.
Consider, as an example, the dentistry advertising case of Borgner v.
Brooks. 123 Borgner practiced general dentistry, with an emphasis on im-
plant dentistry, as a member of the American Academy of Implant Denti-
stry. 124 In order to advertise his implant practice emphasis and his Acade-
my membership, Borgner was required to add two specific disclaimers,
even in the medium of business card advertising. The first disclaimer read:
"[IMPLANT DENTISTRY] IS NOT REGOGNIZED AS A SPECIALTY
AREA BY THE AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION OR THE
FLORIDA BOARD OF DENTISTRY."'125 The second disclaimer read:
"[THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF IMPLANT DENTISTRY] IS NOT
RECOGNIZED AS A BONA FIDE SPECIALTY ACCREDITING
ORGANIZATION BY THE AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION OR
THE FLORIDA BOARD OF DENTISTRY."' 126
It can be assumed that these required disclaimers were well-motivated,
rather than simply reflecting interest group influence. 127 However, if the
text of the second mandated disclaimer is examined, a possible source of
confusion can be found. To say that a group is not recognized as bona fide
121. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 13-37 (1991).
122. Consider the Florida Bar rule prohibiting "self-laudatory" advertisement, as upheld in Mason v.
Florida Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 959 (11 th Cir. 2000). See also Stacy Borisov, Comment, Commercial
Speech: Mandatory Disclaimers in the Regulation of Misleading Attorney Advertising, 12 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 377, 377-78 (2001). Query whether literally "self-laudatory" advertisements could also
be either demonstrably true or sufficiently well-grounded as to not deserve official condemnation as
misleading or confusing. At a minimum, consider a hypothetical advertisement for Clarence Darrow
referring to his involvement in historic trials.
123. 284 F.3d 1204 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
124. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080, 1080 (Dec. 9,
2002) (No. 02-165) (Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 120.
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may mean only that the group is not recognized for some reason not related
to its merits. To other readers, however, the same language may suggest
that the group is, in some respect, less than fully meritorious. 28
State-mandated disclaimers in the professional advertising context may
admittedly not carry quite the same dignitary sting as in some other con-
texts. 29  Still, there must typically be some dignitary impact 3° in being
forced by the state to qualify-if not somehow minimize or even under-
mine-one's own representations about one's professional abilities. This
impact is to some degree independent of the text or terms of the mandated
disclaimer.
If a representation in one's professional advertising is in some sense
misleading, it should instead be subject to prohibition, either by specific
determination or by some general rule. In terms of legitimate dignitary
concerns, it should be more objectionable-from the speaker's stand-
point-to be saddled with an unappealing disclaimer, than to be legally
barred from engaging in genuinely misleading commercial speech.' 3'
Attempts to compromise disclaimer requirements in these contexts typ-
ically add to the murkiness of the disclaimer. Consider the mandatory dis-
claimer laws that allow a professional to then truthfully add to the adver-
tisement that the disclaimer is required, uniformly, by state law. 132 This
language might persuade some readers, perhaps correctly, that the profes-
sional actually remains convinced of the disclaimed representations. Such
language seems to come close to another disclaimer of the mandated dis-
claimer itself. All of this counsels against the overall legal value of the
mandatory disclaimer.
128. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Borgner, 537 U.S. 1080 (No. 02-165).
129. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
130. Of course, if no potential client or professional takes the required disclaimer seriously, the
dignitary impact of the disclaimer is reduced. But one must ask what meaningful public interest the
required disclaimer is then serving.
131. There is not much of a dignitary interest in not being allowed to claim that one has never lost a
jury trial if one has never conducted one. There may even be some dignitary value in being prevented
from objectively demeaning oneself. However, for the standard judicial preference for state-mandated
disclaimers over the prohibition of deceptive speech, see Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1214, which treated
mandatory disclaimers as equivalent to mandatory disclosures of true and relevant information.
132. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C) (2006) (explaining that a
statement for a dietary supplement may be made if "the statement contains, prominently displayed and
in boldface type, the following: 'This statement has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Adminis-




Claims of fraud brought by securities investors or the government,
based on corporate communications of one sort or another, are common.'
A number of such cases involve the application of a possible "safe harbor"
for the companies' otherwise risky optimistic forecasts concerning future
corporate performance.' 34 Such forecasts must be accompanied by "mea-
ningful cautionary statements"'135 that more or less' 36 identify the risks or
contingencies that might derail the corporate speaker's optimistic projec-
tions.137 The legal effect of this cautionary language is referred to as the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine. 138
One should initially think of the qualifying, or the less optimistic, lan-
guage in these corporate statements as disclaimers. Doing so may be
somewhat of a departure from typical disclaimer cases. As is stated
throughout Section IV above, courts are typically well advised not to try to
parse the text and meaning of disclaimers, but to look instead at the under-
lying realities, including the power relationships, conflicts, and policy con-
cerns at stake. The essence of the securities claim in these cases is the al-
legedly fraudulent or misleading character of the corporate communication
at issue. This corporate communication may not fit the standard model of
a main body of communication followed or preceded by a separate and
distinct disclaimer.
One can certainly imagine an optimistic "claim" by a corporation, fol-
lowed, at some distance away, by a separate and distinct disclaimer. How-
ever, more realistically, even the "optimistic" forecast will, in itself, con-
tain some implied tempering through inevitable word choice. The claim
itself may be tempered in magnitude and in probability. Any allegedly
distinct "qualifying" language will in turn also set limits on its own magni-
tude and probability. Some degree of both optimism and pessimism is
133. See generally U.S. v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005); Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164
(2d Cir. 2004); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799 (11 th Cir. 1999); In re Nash Finch Co., 502 F. Supp.
2d 861 (D. Minn. 2007).
134. See Broc Romanek, Corporate Web Disclaimers: To Disclaim or Not Disclaim, It Should Not Be
a Question, in 3 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONiC AGE 1, 9 (1999), availa-
ble at http://www.bowne.com/newsletters/pdf/digest/Nov99_2.pdf.
135. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
136. See Harris, 182 F.3d at 807 (demonstrating failure to explicitly mention the eventually decisive
countervailing factor as not necessarily controlling).
137. Seeid.
138. SEC v. Meltzer, 440 F. Supp. 2d 179, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The idea is roughly that the cautio-
nary language renders any investor reliance on the more optimistic corporate language unreasonable.
Id; see also Employers Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Clorox Co., 353 F.3d
1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004).
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inescapable in every sentence that contributes, jointly, to making up the
overall integrated forecast.
It may therefore be deeply artificial to try to physically separate posi-
tive and negative corporate language and call the latter a distinct disclai-
mer. If, however, there is separate language that is argued to unsay what
the corporation has elsewhere said, one should be extremely reluctant to
give the corporation the benefit of that remote disclaimer. Even if such a
disclaimer is not classified as mere "boilerplate,"'' 39 one must ask why the
language was not more usefully integrated into the text it disclaims. What
sufficient public interest is served by physically separating the optimism
from its own deflation?
Well integrated cautionary language, however, cannot realistically be
disentangled from the company's forecast itself, and thus cannot easily be
counted as a separate disclaimer for practical purposes. But a physically
separated disclaimer invites investor misanalysis.140  Such a disclaimer
should, in accordance with this article's general thesis, 14 1 typically be given
no substantive judicial effect, with the outcome of the underlying fraud
claim resting on other considerations. Presumably the SEC and the courts
can determine the grounds and types of corporate claims that should sup-
port allegations of fraud in the first place.
F. Dietary Supplement Health Claims and Mandatory Disclaimers
Under the present legal regime, dietary supplements142 may carry true
and non-deceptive health claims, 143 as long as they are determined to relate
to the structure and healthy function of the body, but not to the prevention
or treatment of any disease) 44 Health claims relating to bodily structure
and function must be substantiated by the marketer. 145
139. A mere "boilerplate litany of generally applicable risk factors" will not comprise a- sufficient
disclaimer or a cautionary language safe harbor. In re Nash Finch Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (quoting
Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also Daniel S.
Floyd & Sogol IC Pimazar, The Safe Harbor Provision of the PSLRA for Forward-Looking Statements,
in SECURITIES LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 6-1, 6-17 (Jonathan C. Dickey ed., 2007) (stating
that "individuals commonly ignore boilerplate warnings"). Cf Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 176
(2d Cir. 2004) (referring to some of the corporate qualifying language as "formulaic").
140. See Floyd & Pimazar, supra note 139, at 6-18.
141. See supra Section 1.
142. For our purposes, dietary supplements typically provide "vitamins, minerals, herbs or other
botanicals... " R. William Soller et al., Disclaimers in Dietary Supplement Print Advertising: The
Bodybuilding Category as a Model Case for Change, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 375, 375-76 (2007).
143. See id. at 376 (providing an example of the role that calcium may play in bone density).
144. Id. The distinction between claiming to promote healthy bodily function in some respect and
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But even so, products making limited and substantiated non-deceptive
health claims must bear, on their label, the following mandatory disclai-
mer: "This statement has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration. This product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent
any disease.' 46
It is necessary to separate here a critique of the distinctive features of
this disclaimer rule from a broader critique of the legal value of disclaimers
in general. At a specific level, one might well wonder about the value of
this particular disclaimer. If the supplement makes only non-misleading
claims that have indeed been substantiated according to FDA standards,'47
then the mandated FDA disclaimer, if it has any effect at all, may discou-
rage the use of a helpful supplement more than it discourages the use of a
risky or ineffective supplement. Under this assumption, the supplement's
health claims have been supported by FDA standards; for the FDA to then
distance itself from the supplement's health claims through the mandatory
disclaimer may lead potential consumers to conclude that the health claims
are more speculative than they really are, resulting in under-
consumption. 48
However, more broadly, is there not a vital role for a required FDA
disclaimer when the supplement's health claims are false, deceptive, mis-
leading, unsubstantiated, or properly subject to some sort of qualification?
It is, frankly, hard to see why. False or genuinely misleading commercial
speech is subject to prohibition without further free speech interest balanc-
ing. 49 Mere potentially misleading claims 150 should simply be rewritten
until deemed not misleading.' 5' There is, in this commercial context, no
reason to prefer a potentially misleading health claim-conjoined with
some sort of corrective, but also perhaps confusing, disclaimer-over a
straightforward, non-misleading health claim. No vital free speech interest
is upheld in this commercial scenario by judicially preferring the first such
146. Id. Again, to the extent that a disease is defined simply as a substantial deviation from some
healthy function, the logic underlying the regulation may be imperfect.
147. For an interesting discussion of related issues, see Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), which found invalid an FDA regulation requiring marketers of dietary supplements to
obtain FDA approval before labeling supplements with health-related claims.
148. If the advertising-as opposed to the sale itself-of the supplement does not require a similar
disclaimer, the effect of the disclaimer on reasonable consumption of the supplement might be limited.
See Soller et al., supra note 142, at 376 (stating how federal law does not require a disclaimer on print
advertising for a dietary supplement that makes structure and function claims).
149. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
150. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655-59 (finding that marketers of dietary supplements could remedy
the problem of potentially misleading health claims with more clearly crafted disclaimers).
151. Id. at 659-60.
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option over the second. 5 2 For the sake of consumer health, safety, or even
medical efficacy, potentially misleading health claims should be rewritten,
by one entity or another, 5 3 so as to not be thus misleading. There is no
useful role here for the disclaimer.
G. Employment Contract Disclaimers
Disclaimers frequently play a role in contract disputes between em-
ployees and employers. Often, the employer will appear to have supplied
language that may seem inconsistent with employment at will.154 But it
has been said that "[a]n employer may include a clear disclaimer . . . to
avoid contractual liability for a personnel policy.' ' 155 Courts often consider
apparent disclaimers of employee job rights in rather formalistic ways; the
clarity and conspicuousness of a particular disclaimer involving employ-
ment rights beyond an at-will status may thus be the central focus, and may
even be determined by the court as a matter of law.' 56
The conspicuousness of such a disclaimer is, however, no guarantee
that it will be judicially recognized as effective. 57 Even a prominent dis-
claimer of employee rights beyond at-will employment may be denied le-
gal effect if, among other grounds, it is deemed to involve "confusing lega-
lese,"' 58 as opposed to "straightforward terms.' ' 159 Nor are even clear and
conspicuous disclaimers always given effect; inconsistent writings, oral
representations, or actual employment practices may negate a disclaimer of
employment rights beyond at-will employment. 160
While the focus in such cases is often on parsing the language of the
disclaimer to determine whether it is sufficiently clear and conspicuous, it
is difficult to believe that courts are as invariably focused on the bare dis-
claimer itself as is sometimes suggested. Often, there seem to be deeper
issues at stake than the form, the content, or even the context of the dis-
claimer in question.
152. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 ("The Constitution... accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.").
153. See id. at 659. Presumably the supplement seller or manufacturer would typically offer to re-
draft and then document the health claim found potentially misleading.
154. Zahodnick v. IBM Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 914 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (citing Bagwell v.
Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)).
155. Id.
156. See Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 483, 491 (D. S.C. 2006)
(finding a handbook disclaimer conspicuous as a matter of law).
157. See Nicosia v. Wakefem Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. 1994) (finding a handbook
disclaimer that was not prominent to be ineffective).
158. Id. at 560.
159. Id.
160. See Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 826 P.2d 664, 675 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (employer's incon-
sistent statements may negate a disclaimer).
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Consider, for example, one court's declaration that "[w]e reject the
premise that this disclaimer can, as a matter of law, effectively serve as an
eternal escape hatch for an employer who may then make whatever unen-
forceable promises of working conditions it is to its benefit to make."' ' 6'
Whether one agrees with this disfavoring of employment contract disclai-
mers or not, the logic and grounds of the judicial attitude here goes well
beyond the text and terms of the disclaimer itself.
Such an approach to employment contract disclaimers naturally leads
the courts to wonder about the underlying power relationships, actual and
potential interest conflicts, and the broader policy issues at stake. One
might be tempted to ask first whether the disclaimer was fairly bargained
for. One might then wonder why it should be characterized as a disclai-
mer--of some otherwise plausible employee claim, perhaps' 62-rather than
as just one of the terms of the employment contract. If the disclaimer was
not fairly bargained for, one might instead wonder why it should be en-
forced, however it might be interpreted.
In any event, courts should resist the simplistic tendency to find em-
ployment disclaimers either clear and conspicuous, and therefore enforcea-
ble, or not clear and conspicuous, and therefore unenforceable. This focus
on the disclaimer itself can often be evasive or superficial, and may en-
courage judicial manipulativeness in grounding what may really be a dee-
per policy judgment on doubtful formalistic grounds. 163
This is not to suggest that either employers or employees should win
more of the employment disclaimer cases. The point is rather that such
employment termination cases should be decided, whether by statute or
common law, by way of candid reference to the significant underlying
substantive elements,' 64 as opposed to either a simple or complex reference
to the disclaimer. 165
161. Id. at 674.
162. See supra note 2.
163. Some disclaimers are rejected on grounds of ambiguity, apparently apart from the underlying
power relationships, conflicts, and public policies at stake. See Whittington v. City of Crisfield, 204
Fed. App'x 183, 184 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Elliot v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery County
Cmty. Coll., 655 A.2d 46, 50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)); Haselrig v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 585 A.2d 294,
300 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
-164. The disclaimer itself, prior to litigation, may have practical effects, including effects on em-
ployee morale. See Swanson, 826 P.2d at 679 n.3. If many employees are involved in different cir-
cumstances, disclaimers may be difficult to apply uniformly and consistently. Id. More broadly, every
disclaimer may be seen to some extent as an attempt to influence power relationships either between
primary parties or with respect to some outside party, including the public or the courts. Any adverse
effect on employee morale, productivity, or turnover caused by disclaimers would simply be an antic-
ipated or unanticipated element of the underlying problem.
165. A variety of public policy considerations have been offered to counter familiar freedom of
contract arguments, and thus deployed against employment contract disclaimer provisions. See Mi-
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H. Commercial and Consumer Implied Warranty and Tort Disclaimer
Cases
When one turns to implied warranty disclaimers for both commercial
and ordinary consumer customers '--as well as to attempts to disclaim
liability for tort injuries-one again finds an unjustifiable focus on various
aspects of the disclaimer itself, at the expense of inquiring into more fun-
damental substantive matters. Again, there is no need to take sides as to
how willing or reluctant the courts should be to give legal effect to such a
disclaimer. The courts and the legislatures should, however, both attend to
power relationships and conflicts between the parties, as well as to the re-
levant public policy considerations.
The standard first-and too often final-step in testing a disclaimer
under the Uniform Commercial Code involves invoking some generalized
boilerplate principle, 67 such as conspicuousness. Commonly, the required
conspicuousness of a disclaimer is measured by the manipulable test di-
rected towards what a "reasonable person against whom it is to operate"1 68
should have noticed.
The question then might arise whether a particular disclaimer could be
conspicuous to a merchant buyer, even if unclear to a non-merchant con-
sumer. Courts often emphasize broader "reasonable person" language as
distinct from the more contextual "reasonable person against whom it is to
operate.' 69 Considering the disclaimer itself in light of the U.C.C., such
courts perform a judicial examination of the disclaimer's format. This
inquiry may involve typefaces, fonts, capitals, set-offs, boxes, lines of aste-
risks, margin sizes, boldface and italics, colors, contrasting colors of ink,
placement in a document and reference thereto, and visual contrasts. 70
Out of such typographical inquiries, a judicial result of some sort may
emerge. If all courts were to focus on matters such as actual power rela-
tionships among the parties, they might be more open to asymmetries be-
chael J. Philips, Disclaimers of Wrongful Discharge Liability: Time For a Crackdown?, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1131, 1154-55 (1992). But see id. at 1156-57 (stating contrary public policy arguments).
166. For a concise definition of a disclaimer in this specific context, see Lecates v. Hetrich Pontiac
Buick Co., 515 A.2d 163, 171 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986), which stated that a "disclaimer clause is a device
used to control the seller's liability by reducing the number of situations in which the seller can be in
breach of a warranty."
167. See Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing U.C.C. §
2-316 (1977) when stating that "[a] disclaimer is 'conspicuous' when it is so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it").
168. Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1990); supra note 166.
169. Wheeler v. Phoenix Co. of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 532, 536 (1L. App. Ct. 1995); supra note 167.
170. See Accurate Transmissions, Inc. v. Sonax Indus., Inc., No. 04 C 7441, 2007 WL 1773195, at*3-4 (N.D. Ill. June 14,2007); Cate, 790 S.W.2d at 560.
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tween repeat-player merchants and one-time-player consumers 17 1 -
particularly if the latter tend, perhaps quite reasonably, not to read warran-
ty disclaimers in standard form contracts. 172  Realistic consideration of
power relations and policy considerations leads some legislatures and
courts to sometimes refuse to give effect to even clear and conspicuous
disclaimers in consumer cases. 173
Courts may decide, in a more formalistic way, whether a phrase like
"in its present condition" either iS174 or is not 175 sufficiently like the term"as-is" to "immunize the seller."'176 But courts and legislatures may more
justifiably focus on substantive matters such as the minimal reasonable-
ness-assuming the freedom and understanding of the parties-of ex-
changing what is purportedly being sold for the specified price in ques-
tion. 177  It may be unclear, for example, why a free and knowledgeable
consumer would consent to paying a given sum for a dizzyingly complex
durable good with only minimal warranty protection, when a similar price
normally buys a comparable good with genuine warranty protection. It is
reasonable for courts to ask, as merely one question among others, roughly
what packages of goods, services, and warranty protections the particular
purchase price would normally be expected to buy.
There has been controversy over whether strict liability in tort should
be any more or less disclaimable than liability for breach of implied war-
ranties. 178 Some courts have decisively rejected attempts to disclaim liabil-
ity for injurious products where the claim is brought either in negligence or
in strict liability. 79 To the extent that courts hold open the possibility of
disclaiming tort injuries, though, the recommendation herein would remain
the same. Instead of reading a number of aspects of the typography within
171. See Cate, 790 S.W.2d at 560 (rejecting the argument that there should be a lesser standard of
conspicuousness for a disclaimer made to a merchant).
172. See id. at 565 (Spears, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 565-66 (citing statutes and cases); see also Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and
Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 199, 261-63 (1985) (arguing that
implied warranty disclaimers should generally not be enforced against consumers).
174. First Nat'l Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784-85 (111. App. Ct. 1965).
175. Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat, 415 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
176. Lecates v. Hetrich Pontiac Buick Co., 515 A.2d 163, 168 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
177. See Blankenship v. Northtown Ford, Inc., 420 N.E.2d 167, 170-71 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981). In
Blankenship, the court initially engaged in a merely formalistic investigation into the disclaimer's
conspicuousness, id. at 170, but then focused on realistic underlying considerations, id at 171 (citing
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4).
178. See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335 N.E.2d 275, 280 (N.Y. 1975) (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring) (discussing confusion over whether a cause of action for strict liability is the same as that
for breach of implied warranty, assuming no disclaimer defense). Cf Elite Prof'ls, Inc. v. Carrier
Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (citing William Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 799, 833 (1966)) (providing a starkly limited
approach to disclaimers in strict liability tort cases).
179. See Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., Inc., 748 A.2d 261, 268-69 (R.I. 2000).
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the disclaimer, 180 courts and legislatures should focus on underlying power
relationships, conflicts of interest, and public policies. As one possible
avenue, courts might look to injury avoidance costs and to the price agreed
upon to help determine whether fairness suggests that the buyer or the sel-
ler bears the risk of non-negligent injuries.181
I. Disclaimers of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
In consumer as well as commercial contexts, the courts and legislatures
differ in their readiness to enforce disclaimers of an implied warranty of
habitability.182 Regardless of the outcome, however, courts in this context
too often focus on the disclaimer and its surrounding language. An Illinois
Supreme Court case involving a condominium garage, for example, was
decided at the trial court level based on the absence of the magic language
stating "implied warranty of habitability" in the disclaimer. 183 The trial
court focused also on the conspicuousness of the location, 184 typeface
size,185 and the "plain language" 186 of the disclaimer. The Illinois Supreme
Court endorsed the relevance of the latter considerations on a case-by-case
basis,'87 but decided the case solely on the grounds that the disclaimer had
failed to refer explicitly to an implied warranty of habitability.188
Courts often decide habitability disclaimer cases on similarly formalis-
tic grounds, such as on the supposed clarity or lack of clarity of a read or
unread disclaimer.' 89 Rather than focusing on the clarity regarding often
unread language, the courts could instead consider, for example, the status,
expertise, and any distinctive bargaining leverage of the parties; which
party took the initiative in proposing the underlying transaction, if not also
the disclaimer terms at issue; whether one or both parties was represented
180. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (providing various conspicuousness factors).
181. See generally GuIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 17-33 (1970).
182. See P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021 n.1 (Utah 1991) (talking in terms of"waivers," but
assuming that a waiver of an implied warranty of habitability by a tenant is. essentially the mirror image
of a disclaimer of that warranty by a lessor).





187. Id. at 981.
188. Id.
189. See Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., Inc., 725 P.2d 422, 426 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (asking, "What
could be more clear to a buyer than the following contract language .... ).
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by independent counsel; and whether the buyoer or lessee had ample oppor-
tunity to meaningfully inspect the property.
Courts often take into account one or more of the relevant underlying
considerations in habitability warranty cases.191 To judicially inquire into
underlying matters is, admittedly, not to absolutely ensure the best out-
come. It can also be costly even if ultimately accurate. To reduce such
costs by relying on generalizations invites the occasional inaccuracy. 92
Thus if a court always assumes, for example, that grossly unequal bargain-
ing power will characterize residential tenancies 9' but not commercial
tenancies,' 94 there will inevitably be some misclassifications in both kinds
of cases.
Still, some cost-reducing judicial generalizations will be worth the oc-
casional error. It is therefore worth assuming that modem residential te-
nants are interested more in living space than in land,' 9 have a limited
repair skill set, 196 are geographically mobile and thus only minimally inter-
ested in making elaborate repairs, 9 7 would require access to expensive
equipment and common areas to effect some repairs, 98 and may simply not
have enough of an interest in the property to justify repair financing.' 99 At
the very least, these considerations should be weighed, along with safety
and health concerns, against any possible reduction in the otherwise antic-
ipated rent when courts move beyond the text of the disclaimer in habita-
bility cases.
V. CONCLUSION
It is illuminative to conclude with a brief reflection on a disclaimer that
has popularly come to represent all disclaimers. A recent Google web
190. In Frickel, virtually all these considerations cut in favor of the seller and thus in favor of enforc-
ing the disclaimer. Id. at 423. However, even the dissenters adopted a formalistic approach, focusing
on the disclaimer itself. Id. at 434 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "a valid disclaimer of the
implied warranty of a residential structure should be written, conspicuous,... include the term 'habita-
bility,' [and] should be explicitly negotiated.").
191. See Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider, 220 S.W.3d 905, 913-14 (Tex. 2007) (considering
"uequal bargaining power" between the parties).
192. See id. at 914 (finding, without considering other factors, that "as-is" language negated claims
for breach of implied warranty and negligence).
193. Id. at 913 (citing 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 232 [2][b] (1991)).
194. Id.
195. Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Wash. 1973) (en banc).
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search for the phrase "your mileage may vary" resulted in 822,000 hits.200
But it is best to think of this disclaimer in something like its original auto-
mobile gas mileage context in order to illustrate the basic theme of this
article.
It may be tempting to put the disclaimer "your mileage may vary" un-
der the microscope, and to look for qualities like clarity and conspicuous-
ness in order to decide whether to give it legal effect. The recommended
approach set forth above, however, is to look elsewhere, and specifically at
matters such as the conflicting interests, power relationships, and public
policies at stake. Of course, that task cannot be undertaken here in any
detail. But the mistake of judicially focusing on the disclaimer itself can
be briefly illustrated by simply asking about the real social value of this
particular disclaimer under ordinary circumstances.
Suppose, as has sometimes been suggested in the past,20 that official
EPA gas mileage estimates are not only inaccurate, but inaccurate in a sys-
tematic way, particularly in a way that tends to overstate gas mileage fig-
ures by about fifteen percent.20 2 In any event, begin by assuming, hypo-
thetically, that the EPA mileage figures-for both stop-and-go city and
uninterrupted highway driving, as displayed on vehicles for sale-are con-
sistently and substantially higher than what many drivers would expe-
rience. Further suppose that for one reason or another,20 3 the official EPA
mileage figures, as advertised, are nevertheless credible enough to have
some impact on vehicle buyers' choices-but are also skewed sufficiently
high, on a percentage basis, to in some cases count as misleading, or at
least potentially so.2 4
It must then be asked what the real value of the disclaimer "your mi-leage may vary" is. If the idea is that this disclaimer may dampen unrealis-
200. Google Search Results, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%22your+mileage+may+vary
%22&aq=f&oq= (last visited June 29, 2008). Few hits were obtained under Google News and Shop-
ping respectively. Remarkably, the Internet abbreviation "YMMV" turned up 1,980,000 hits the same
day.
201. CNN Money, Your Mileage May Vary: The EPA's Fuel Efficiency Estimates Are in the Hot
Seat These Days (Oct. 8, 2004), http://money.cnn.com/2004/09/02/pf/autos/epa/index.htm; see also 49
U.S.C. § 32904 (2006) (providing a calculation of average fuel economy); 40 C.F.R. § 600.307-08
(2006) (setting forth fuel economy label requirements); True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 520 F. Supp. 2d
1175 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing a buyer suit against a car manufacturer for false claims of fuel effi-
ciency).
202. CNN Money, supra note 201. For a claim of more recent EPA improvement in this regard, see
FuelEconomy.gov, Your Mileage Will Still Vary, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/FEG/why_differ.shtml
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
203. For critical reference to "agency capture" theory, see David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public
Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 121-22 (2000).
204. For the permissibility of governmental regulation regarding misleading private commercial
speech, as opposed to government speech or government-mandated commercial speech, see Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.
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tic expectations generated by the assumedly misleading mileage figures, it
must be asked why it is best to create unrealistic mileage expectations and
then, to whatever degree, dampen those expectations with the disclaimer.
Does a fifteen percent error really have an equal effect on all car models?
Would there not be less need for the disclaimer if the mileage figures were
more accurately presented, or at least not systematically skewed upward?
What is the real social value of the disclaimer? Why not focus regulation
instead on the accuracy of the mileage figures?
Suppose that the EPA mileage figures were more realistic. It would
still be true that many drivers would experience gas mileages at some va-
riance from any posted figures.20 5 But what would then be the value of the
disclaimer? Presumably, most competent adults do not believe that their
gas mileage is entirely independent of anything and everything they do.
But even if they do, the EPA disclaimer itself, in the form of the standard
slogan, offers only minimal guidance in improving one's mileage.20 6
This, of course, is not to suggest that most disclaimers in general are
useless or harmful. But the example of the EPA vehicle mileage disclai-
mer usefully redirects the attention away from the disclaimer itself, and
toward more important issues of public understanding, possibly misleading
or deceptive speech, sensible regulatory policy, and the public interest
quite apart from the disclaimer. The standard EPA mileage disclaimer
should thus serve mainly to call one's attention to those underlying cir-
cumstances and policies. In this respect, this disclaimer is entirely typical
of the various sorts of disclaimers surveyed above.
205. See supra note 201 (revealing some relevant factors).
206. The EPA language does go on to raise issues relating to driver behavior and vehicle condition,
with a nod toward useful additional pamphlet material. See 40 C.F.R. § 600.307-08(b)(4), (9) (2006).
But an extrinsic educational pamphlet has generally moved well beyond what is thought of as a dis-
claimer.
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